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COMMENTS
REMEDIES FOR RENEGED PLEA BARGAINS IN
CALIFORNIA
INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been growing recognition and
approval of the use of the plea bargain' in the disposition of
criminal cases. Indeed, plea bargaining has become an essential element in the fair administration of justice. The overwhelming majority of criminal defendants are convicted and
sentenced as a result of negotiations between the prosecutor
and the defendant.2
Disposition of charges by plea bargain offers advantages
for all parties involved. Benefits to the defendant include reduced penalties, 3 sparing of the notoriety which attends trial,4
and shortening of the time between the charge and disposition,
thereby maximizing the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty
defendant when he is ultimately imprisoned.' The chief benefit
to the state is prompt disposition of criminal cases,' which
relieves clogged court calendars, reduces costs of trial, and increases efficiency and flexibility of the criminal process.7 In
addition, plea bargaining allows the court to treat each defen1. "Plea bargain" is the common phrase for the "disposition of criminal charges
by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused ....
" Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). For a comprehensive study of the plea bargain and the
tactical procedures surrounding it, see D. Newman, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION
OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966).
2. In California, approximately 82 percent of all defendants convicted of felonies

in 1972 pleaded guilty. See

CAL. BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, CRIME AND DELIN-

16 (1973). A primary explanation of the large number of guilty
pleas is the willingness of the prosecutor to enter into a bargain with the defendant.
Comment, The Constitutionality of Reindicting Successful Plea-BargainAppellants
on the Original, Higher Charges, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 258 n.1 (1974).
3. People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 604, 477 P.2d 409, 413, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 389
(1970).
4. Bongiovanni, Jr., Guilty Plea Negotiations, 7 DUQUESNE L. REV. 542 (1969).
5. 404 U.S. at 261; see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970). Prospects for rehabilitation are enhanced by prompt, final disposition of most criminal
cases, thereby allowing the correctional processes to begin immediately. 397 U.S. at
752. Avoidance of the corrosive impact of forced idleness during pretrial confinement
of those who are denied release pending trial may have a rehabilitative effect. 404 U.S.
at 261.
6. 404 U.S. at 261.
7. 3 Cal. 3d at 604, 477 P.2d at 413, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
QUENCY IN CALIFORNIA
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dant as an individual in adapting the degree and character of
punishment to the facts of the particular offense. 8
Both the United States9 and the California Supreme
Courts'" have given express approval to the use of the plea
bargain. In addition, the California Legislature has enacted
Penal Code section 1192.5," which provides statutory recogni8. Id. at 605, 477 P.2d at 413, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
It must be noted that approval of the use of the plea bargain is far from universal.
Many commentators on the subject concede that the procedure potentially or in fact
poses serious problems. One author maintains that the complexity of the criminal
justice system and administrative pressures within prosecutors' offices combine to
create the need for speed and efficiency in handling criminal cases. The result is that
"[tihe scrutiny of the criminal trial process is lost. Indeed, the primary purpose of
plea bargaining is to assure that the jury trial system established by the Constitution
is seldom utilized." Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 1387, 1388-89 (1970). Another author contends that the practice of plea bargaining
has created a sense of unease and suspicion, such that the quality of criminal justice
has become suspect. Comment, ProsecutorialDiscretion-A Re-evaluation Of The
Prosecutor's Unbridled Discretion And Its Potential For Abuse, 21 DE PAUL L. REV.
485, 514 (1971).
Despite these criticisms, the courts have recognized that without the practice,
every criminal charge would be subjected to a full-scale trial, thereby creating the need
for many times more court facilities and judges than presently exist. Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
It is beyond the purview of this comment to examine the general problems relating
to plea bargains. There is a plethora of materials on the subject in addition to those
previously mentioned. See Wheatley, Plea Bargaining-A Case For Its Continuance,
59 MASS. L.Q. 31 (1974); Comment, PleaBargainIn HistoricalPerspective, 23 BUFFALO
L. REV. 499 (1974); Comment, Judicial Supervision Over CaliforniaPlea Bargaining:
Regulating the Trade, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 962 (1971); Note, Plea Bargaining, 60 CALIF.
L. REV. 894 (1972).
9. 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971). See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753
(1970), in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of a guilty plea obtained by
means of a plea bargain:
[W]e cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State to extend a
benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the
State and who demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to
admit his crime and to enter the correctional system in a frame of mind
that affords hope for success in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time
than might otherwise be necessary.
10. 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385. The court confirmed the
legality of the plea bargain and recognized its useful and necessary function in the
administration of justice:
In a day when courts strive to simplify trial procedures and to achieve
speedier dispatch of litigation, we believe that the recognition of the legal
status of the plea bargain will serve as a salutary timesaver as well as a
means to dispel the procedural obscurantism that now enshrouds it. The
grant of legal status to the plea bargain should enable the court in each
case to reach a frank, open and realistic appraisal of its propriety.
Id. at 599, 477 P.2d at 410, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
11. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1192.5 (West Supp. 1975), enacted in 1970, provides:
Upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to an accusatory pleading
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tion of the plea bargain and specifies the rights of a defendant
who bargains for leniency.
Recent California cases have focused on the remedies
available to defendants whose bargains have been breached
either by prosecutors or judges, and to defendants who attempt
to rescind their bargains after becoming apprehensive of or
disappointed in their sentences. This comment will examine
the remedies which courts in California have been granting and
refusing to such defendants. Brief examination will be given to
the types of breaches which commonly occur after bargains are
made, and the theories upon which relief (if any) is granted. A
more extensive analysis of the actual relief which California
courts have afforded defendants will serve as a foundation for
a prediction of what defendants whose bargains have been
breached may expect in the future.
THEORIES OF RELIEF

There are basically two theories upon which relief is
granted to defendants whose bargains have been breached. The
first is the approach federal and California courts have taken
charging a felony, the plea may specify the punishment to the same
extent as it may be specified by the jury on a plea of not guilty or fixed
by the court on a plea of guilty, nolo contendere, or not guilty, and may
specify the exercise by the court thereafter of other powers legally available to it.
Where such plea is accepted by the prosecuting attorney in open
court and is approved by the court, the defendant, except as otherwise
provided in this section, cannot be sentenced on such plea to a punishment more severe than that specified in the plea and the court may not
proceed as to such plea other than as specified in the plea.
If the court approves of the plea, it shall inform the defendant prior
to the making of the plea that (1) its approval is not binding, (2) it may,
at the time set for the hearing on the application for probation or pronouncement of judgment, withdraw its approval in the light of further
consideration of the matter, and (3) in such case, the defendant shall be
permitted to withdraw his plea if he desires to do so. The court shall also
cause an inquiry to be made of the defendant to satisfy itself that the plea
is freely and voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis for such
plea.
If such plea is not accepted by the prosecuting attorney and approved by the court, the plea shall be deemed withdrawn and the defendant may then enter such plea or pleas as would otherwise have been
available.
If such plea is withdrawn or deemed withdrawn, it may not be received in evidence in any criminal, civil, or special action or proceeding
of any nature, including proceedings before agencies, commissions,
boards, and tribunals.
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when examining frustrated plea bargains and is called "voluntariness."
The voluntariness theory provides that while the practice
of plea bargaining does not in and of itself render a guilty
plea involuntary . . . the subsequent realization that the
promises have been misrepresented to the defendant or
will not be fulfilled will cause the plea to be viewed involuntary."
The second theory upon which relief is granted-called
"fair play"-has ostensibly been adopted by fewer courts. This
theory focuses not on the effects of the plea bargaining procedure on the defendant's free will, but "upon either the equities
involved in the methods and procedures adopted in obtaining
a negotiated guilty plea, or the actual result of the bargain to
the defendant."' 3
An examination of major federal and California case authorities in the area of plea bargaining reveals that there has
been an emphasis on the voluntariness theory. However, the
fair play analysis commonly appears as a supplement to the
voluntariness approach. 4 Thus, it appears that these two theories are in effect merged to form an overall standard of fairness
and voluntariness which must be observed in order to render a
plea bargain valid.
The United States Supreme Court in Brady v. United
States" relied heavily on the voluntariness theory in affirming
the validity of the plea bargain. The Court first determined
that in order to be valid a guilty plea must be "voluntary" and
"intelligent."' 6
Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences."7
This would appear to mean that the circumstances surrounding the making of the plea, including actual or threatened
12.

Note, The Legitimation of Plea Bargaining:Remedies ForBroken Promises,

11 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 771, 785-86 (1973).
13. Id. at 790.

14. See notes 15-37 and accompanying text infra.
15. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). See note 9 supra.
16. Id. at 747; see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969), and note 23
infra.
17. 397 U.S. at 748.
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physical or mental coercion of the bargaining defendant, must
be examined to determine voluntariness. 8
The Court again endorsed the voluntariness theory in
Santobello v. New York.'" It stated that "[t]he [guilty] pleas
must be voluntary and knowing. . .. "20 In addition, the Court
emphasized the importance of fairness to the defendant in the
bargaining process: "[H]owever, all of these [beneficial] considerations [which are fostered by the plea bargaining process] presuppose fairness in securing agreement between an
accused and a prosecutor."'"
The Santobello decision reflects the Supreme Court's recognition that both theories support a remedy for a defendant
whose bargain has been breached. The California courts have
followed a similar course.
The case of In re Tah122 expounded the procedures relating
to defendants who plead quilty, as set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in the landmark decision of Boykin v.
Alabama." The petitioner in Tahl had pleaded guilty to two
counts of murder and one count each of attempted robbery,
grand theft and rape. In a habeas corpus proceeding he contended that his guilty plea was not made voluntarily and with
18. The Court did say that defendant's motives in negotiating a plea do not
render the bargain invalid:
We decline to hold, however, that a guilty plea is compelled and invalid
under the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by the defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather than
face a wider range of possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction
and a higher penalty authorized by law for the crime charged.
Id.at 751.
19. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). Santobello involved a plea of guilty to a lesser included
offense by the defendant in exchange for a promise by the prosecutor not to make
recommendation as to sentence. Id. at 258-59. The prosecutor failed to abide by the
terms of the agreement, and the Court held that this invalidated the plea bargain. Id.
at 262.
20. Id. at 261.
21. Id.
22. 1 Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d 449, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969).
23. 395 U.S. 238 (1969). In this case petitioner pleaded guilty to five counts of
robbery, and a jury sentenced him to death. The petitioner did not address the court
and the judge asked him no questions concerning his plea. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction because the record did not disclose that the defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered his plea of guilty. The Court stated that in order for
a plea of guilty to be voluntary, it must appear in the record that defendant has
knowledge and a voluntary understanding that by pleading guilty he is waiving the
privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront
his accusers. Id. at 243-44. See also Note, Withdrawal Of Negotiated Guilty Pleas:
Quid Pro Quo From Defendants, 5 Sw. U.L. REV. 215-16 (1973).
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full understanding of its consequences."
In examining the petitioner's entry of his guilty plea, the
California Supreme Court concluded that in order for a guilty
plea to be valid the record must indicate a free and intelligent
waiver of those constitutional rights which are abandoned by
a guilty plea. 5 The Tahl court ruled that those rights include
the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one's accusers, and
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination."2 Itspecifically stated that "in California such a waiver must be expressed in words by the defendant and cannot be implied from
the defendant's conduct." 7 This language indicates an emphasis on the effects of the guilty plea procedure on defendants'
free will (voluntariness); in addition, the requirement that the
record must indicate a valid waiver evidences concern for the
methods and procedures involved in the making of that plea
(fair play).
The court reaffirmed Tahl in a subsequent case, In re
Sutherland,"s in which the defendant pleaded guilty to one
24. 1 Cal. 3d at 124, 460 P.2d at 450, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 578. The opinion does not
specify what consequences the defendant claimed to be unaware of.
25. Id. at 132, 460 P.2d at 456, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 584. The court emphasized the
importance of leaving an adequate record of the proceedings:
[Tihe record must contain on its face direct evidence that the accused
was aware, or made aware, of his right to confrontation to a jury trial,
and against self-incrimination, as well as the nature of the charge and the
consequences of his plea.

Id.
26. Id. at 130, 460 P.2d at 455, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 583. See also In re Johnson, 62
Cal. 2d 325, 398 P.2d 420, 42 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1965). There is recent California authority
which indicates that failure to advise the defendant of certain consequences "collateral" to entering a plea of guilty constitutes reversible error. An analysis of that authority is beyond the scope of this comment. For a brief discussion of the problem see
Comment, Lawful Impermanent Residence: Deportation Without Warning For Minor
Drug Offenses, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 1319-22 (1975), and the cases cited therein.
27. 1 Cal. 3d at 131, 460 P.2d at 455, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 583. The Boykin-Tahl
standards have been applied to misdemeanor prosecutions as well as to felonies. Mills
v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 288, 301-02, 515 P.2d 273, 282-83, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329,
338-39 (1973); see In re Gannon, 26 Cal. App. 3d 731, 103 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1972). In Mills
the court also addressed the issue of whether the standards apply to pleas of nolo
contendere:
In the Mills case, the challenged conviction was based on a plea of
nolo contendere, rather than a plea of guilty, but the People make no
contention-nor could they properly do so-that the distinction is relevant to the applicability of the Boykin-Tahl safeguards. While there is
some difference between a "nolo" plea and a guilty plea in terms of the
collateral use of such a plea, for purposes of the Boykin-Tahl doctrine the
two are functional equivalents.
10 Cal. 3d at 298 n.7, 515 P.2d at 280 n.7, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 336 n.7.
28. 6 Cal. 3d 666, 493 P.2d 857, 100 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1972).
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count of possession of drugs in exchange for dismissal of four
remaining counts. The court found the plea defective because
there was no indication from the record that the defendant had
expressly waived his right to confront his accusers or his privilege against self-incrimination. 9
Tahl involved a simple guilty plea, rather than an actual
bargain. Nevertheless, since a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere" is included within the terms of a plea bargain, the
same rights are waived upon entering a bargained plea. Therefore, as Sutherland demonstrates, 31 the record must indicate a
voluntary and knowing waiver by incorporating the terms of
the agreement into the record.
In 1970, the court undertook a review of the status and
validity of plea bargaining in California in People v. West. 2
This case confirmed that a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is
not rendered involuntary merely because it is the product of
plea bargaining between the defendant and the state.33 However, the court emphasized that fairness to the defendant must
be insured in the bargaining procedures. The court stated:
[T]he plea bargain can be viable only if it is candidly
disclosed to the trial court and incorporated in the record
of the case. Through that procedure the murky fog of subterfuge34 that now suffuses the plea bargain can be swept
away.
In the recent case of People v. Johnson,35 the California
Supreme Court again underscored the importance of insuring
that the procedures outlined in Penal Code section 1192.5 3 are
complied with:
The section requires that the court's acceptance of a guilty
plea and defendant's accompanying waiver of his constitu29. Id. at 668, 493 P.2d at 858, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 130; accord, People v. Rizer, 5
Cal. 3d 35, 484 P.2d 1367, 95 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1971); see Note, PleaBargaining, 60 CALIF.
L. REV. 894 (1972).
30. See note 27 supra.
31. 6 Cal. 3d at 669-70, 493 P.2d at 859, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
32. 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970).
33. Id. at 604, 477 P.2d at 413, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
34. Id. at 613-14, 477 P.2d at 421, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 397; cf. Fischer, Beyond

Santobello-Remedies for Reneged Plea Bargains,2 SAN

FERNANDO VALLEY

L. REV. 121,

126 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Fischer].
35. 10 Cal. 3d 868, 519 P.2d 604, 112 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1974).
36. See note 11 supra. Section 1192.5 and the California Supreme Court's recent
interpretation of it are discussed in detail in text accompanying notes 82-96 and in
notes 94-95 infra.
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tional rights be viewed only "in the strong light of full
disclosure" [citing People v. West] to the defendant of his
rights. 7
It is clear from the foregoing cases that the California
courts employ a combined voluntariness-fair play theory upon
which relief, if any, is granted for breaches of plea bargains.
The emphasis, to be sure, is on preserving the defendant's ability to exercise his free will; in addition, there appears to be
concern that the procedures for entering a plea of guilty be fair
and equitable.
TYPES OF BREACH AND AVAILABLE REMEDIES

Introduction
There are commonly three situations in which bargaining
defendants seek judicial relief from their pleas, and the availability of a particular remedy may depend upon the defect in the
bargain. The first situation has been called "cold feet.""8 Typically, the defendant suffers from apprehension as the date on
which he must begin serving a bargained-for sentence approaches. There is no claim that the terms of the bargain have
been breached. Included in this category are those cases in
which a defendant later feels his bargain was unfair, and therefore seeks judicial relief from the plea. Where there is no allegation that the bargain has been breached, the remedies theoretically available to a defendant include a motion under Penal
Code section 101811 to change his plea of guilty, a motion to
vacate judgment in the form of a petition for a writ of error
coram nobis,4 ° or an appeal from the judgment under Penal
Code section 1237.5.4'
The second and third categories, with which this comment
37. 10 Cal. 3d at 871, 519 P.2d at 606, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 558. For a detailed
discussion of the decision see text accompanying notes 88-98 and notes 94-95 infra.
38. Fischer, supra note 34, at 126. "Cold feet" is the phrase coined by that author
for situations in which no claim of a breached bargain is made by the defense.
39. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1018 (West Supp. 1975) provides in part:
On application of the defendant at any time before judgment the court
may . . . for a good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.
"Such relief, if good cause is shown, is available even if the plea was entered pursuant
to a plea bargain." In re Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 679, 685 n.8, 511 P.2d 1153, 1157 n.8, 108
Cal. Rptr. 801, 805 n.8 (1973).
40. See notes 67-72 and accompanying text infra.
41. See note 74 infra.
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is chiefly concerned, involve actual breach of a plea bargain by
either the prosecutor or the court itself. In the former case, the
defendant usually claims that he has suffered prejudice as a
result of the prosecutor's failure to abide by the bargain." The
latter situation, breach by the court, ordinarily occurs when the
trial judge fails to advise the defendant of his rights, or when
a sentence is imposed which does not conform to the terms of
the agreement."
There are theoretically two alternate forms of relief available to a defendant whose bargain has been frustrated by the
prosecutor or the court. First, the defendant may be allowed to
withdraw his plea of guilty." Indeed, the California Supreme
Court in a recent case stated that if the trial court initially
rejects defendant's offer to plead guilty in exchange for a specification of punishment under Penal Code section 1192.5, the
defendant's plea of guilty is deemed withdrawn.4 5 The effect of
withdrawal is to nullify the guilty plea and allow reinstatement
of the original charges."
The alternate form of relief available is a grant of specific
perfomance of the terms of the agreement.47 This remedy has
seldom been granted by courts in broken bargain cases. Moreover, a recent case appears to have foreclosed the availability
of specific performance in almost all broken bargain factual
settings. 8 Thus, realistically there remains only one remedy
available to a defendant whose bargain has been frustrated by
the prosecutor or the court: withdrawal of the plea of guilty.
Cold Feet
There has been much litigation in the plea bargain area
where the defendant does not claim that the terms of his bargain have been violated but simply suffers from cold feet as he
faces a jail term. Defendant's primary remedy in this type of
situation is to move to withdraw his plea of guilty in the trial
42. See Fischer, supra note 34, at 128-31, 133-37.
43. See id. at 131-33, 138-41.
44. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 263; People v. Delles, 69 Cal. 2d 906,
910, 447 P.2d 629, 632, 73 Cal. Rptr. 389, 392 (1968).
45. People v. Johnson, 10 Cal. 3d 868, 872, 519 P.2d 604, 606-07, 112 Cal. Rptr.
556, 558-59 (1974).
46. Note, The Legitimation of Plea Bargaining:Remedies For Broken Promises,
11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 771, 792 (1973).
47. Id.; see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
48. See notes 96-104 and accompanying text infra.
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court and enter a new plea.4" It has long been the established
rule in California that the court has the discretion to allow a
defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty and enter a new plea, 0
but the defendant may not withdraw his plea simply because
he is disappointed with or apprehensive about the sentence, or
decides later that his chances of acquittal are improved.5 '
There must be good cause shown in order for a plea to be
withdrawn. 2
The California courts have upheld this rule in recent years.
In People v. Fratianno3 the defendant was charged by
amended information with conspiracy to commit grand theft,
grand theft, and a misdemeanor violation of the Public Utilities Code. Defendant pleaded not guilty, but later changed his
plea to guilty after negotiating a bargain with the prosecutor
in which the charge was reduced to conspiracy to commit petty
theft. The prosecutor explicitly stated that sentencing was
solely up to the judge, and that he could not guarantee that
defendant would be granted probation. 4
At the sentencing hearing the defendant made a plea for
probation. The court denied it; the defendant then moved to
withdraw his plea of guilty. The motion was denied and the
court sentenced the defendant to prison.
The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision. It
recognized that a plea of guilty may be withdrawn pursuant to
49. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 1018 (West Supp. 1975), supra note 39. Section 1018
applies to misdemeanor prosecutions as well as to felonies. People v. Cruz, 12 Cal. 3d
562, 565 n.4, 526 P.2d 250, 252 n.4, 116 Cal. Rptr. 242, 244 n.4 (1974).
50. People v. Caruso, 174 Cal. App. 2d 624, 634, 345 P.2d 282, 288 (1959); see
People v. Francis, 42 Cal. 2d 335, 267 P.2d 8 (1954); People v. Griggs, 17 Cal. 2d 621,
110 P.2d 1031 (1941).
In Francisthe court stated that "the withdrawal of such a plea rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court and a denial may not be disturbed unless the trial court
has abused its discretion." 42 Cal. 2d at 338, 267 P.2d at 9.
51. People v. Caruso, 174 Cal. App. 2d 624, 642, 345 P.2d 282, 293 (1959).
52. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1018 (West Supp. 1975), supra note 39. It is not clear what
test should be employed to satisfy the "good cause" requirement of section 1018. It is
clear, however, that more is required than disappointment in or apprehension about
the sentence. See id., supra note 39 and note 54 infra. An illustrative sampling of
appropriate grounds for withdrawal of a guilty plea includes the following: People v.
Campos, 3 Cal. 2d 15, 43 P.2d 274 (1935) (fraud or duress resulted in a denial of a trial
on the merits); People v. Mitchell, 134 Cal. App. 2d 912, 286 P.2d 1016 (1955) (mistake,
ignorance, or inadvertence overcame the defendant's free will). These cases appear to
emphasize the importance of entering a plea freely and voluntarily in an atmosphere
of fairness to the defendant.
53. 6 Cal. App. 3d 211, 85 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1970).
54. Id. at 216, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
55. Id. at 219, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 759.
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Penal Code section 1018 if it can be shown that the defendant's
exercise of free judgment was impaired, but grounds for relief
must be established by clear and convincing evidence." It followed the established case authority57 in holding that a defendant's disappointment in the sentence presents no ground for
the exercise of judicial discretion to permit the plea of guilty
to be withdrawn."' The court also pointed out that disappointment is not the only ground insufficient to invoke the exercise
of judicial discretion:
[T]he fact that after plea but before sentence the defendant has become apprehensive regarding the anticipated
sentence [is not] sufficient to compel the exercise of judicial discretion so as to permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn. Nor may the defendant enter a plea of guilty confident that if by some fortuitous circumstance his chances
of an acquittal are substantially improved, he may thereafter withdraw his guilty plea as of right."
The court had little trouble rejecting defendant's appeal. He
had not satisfied his burden of establishing good cause to withdraw his plea of guilty.60
The California Supreme Court recently concurred with
this reasoning in In re Brown."'In that case, Maxine Brown was
56. Id. at 222, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 761; see People v. Tanner, 13 Cal. App. 3d 596,
599, 91 Cal. Rptr. 656, 658 (1970); People v. Barteau, 10 Cal. App. 3d 483, 487, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 139, 141 (1970); People v. Coley, 257 Cal. App. 2d 787, 802, 65 Cal. Rptr. 559,
569 (1968); People v. Goldman, 245 Cal. App. 2d 376, 380, 53 Cal. Rptr. 810, 813 (1966).
57. See cases cited note 50 supra.
58. 6 Cal. App. 3d at 222, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 761:
As we stated in People v. Caruso, 174 Cal. App. 2d 624, 642, 345 P.2d
282: "The fact that the defendant is disappointed in the sentence he
received following a plea of guilty presents no ground for the exercise of
the judicial discretion to permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn."
Accord, People v. Morgan, 21 Cal. App. 3d 33, 42-43, 98 Cal. Rptr. 165, 171 (1971).
59. 6 Cal. App. 3d at 222, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 761.
60. See People v. Brotherton, 239 Cal. App. 2d 195, 201, 48 Cal. Rptr. 513, 51718 (1966), which helps to illuminate the nature of the defendant's burden of showing
good cause:
The liberality [with which Penal Code section 1018 must be construed]
is to be applied in determining whether the established facts constitute
the good cause required by the statute. It does not relieve the applicant
from coming forward with requisite proof that the ends of justice will be
subserved by permitting him to change his plea from guilty to not guilty.
The court also noted that section 1018 would allow withdrawal of a guilty plea if
mistake, ignorance, inadvertence, or any other factor which overcame the defendant's
exercise of free judgment is shown by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 200, 48 Cal.
Rptr. at 517; see People v. Cruz, 12 Cal. 3d 562, 566, 526 P.2d 250, 252, 116 Cal. Rptr.
242, 244 (1974).
61. 9 Cal. 3d 679, 511 P.2d 1153, 108 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1973).
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charged by information with armed robbery. She initially entered a plea of not guilty. Later, she pleaded guilty to second
degree robbery pursuant to a bargain in which she would receive six months in the county jail and a grant of probation. 2
At the probation hearing the defendant moved to withdraw her
guilty plea under Penal Code section 1018.3 The trial court
denied her motion. She had changed her mind as to the most
appropriate course to follow, presumably because of apprehension about serving six months in jail, or because of disappointment in the terms of the bargain. 4 The Supreme Court of California upheld the trial court's denial of her motion, "in view of
the almost total lack of substantive grounds asserted in support
of the motion." 5 It found no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's refusal to permit withdrawal:
It is not enough that a defendant assert that she has
changed her mind as to the most expeditious course to
follow. When, as here, the trial court denies a motion to
withdraw a plea on such bare assertion, no abuse of discretion appears. 6
These decisions reflect a reluctance on the part of the
courts to grant the available remedy of plea withdrawal in the
trial court when defendants suffer from cold feet.
There are two alternatives available to defendants whose
motions to withdraw their guilty pleas are denied by the trial
court, or who fail to make such motions before judgment. The
first is a petition for a writ of error coram nobis.67 Successful
procurement of a writ results in vacation of the earlier judgment. 6 However, the writ will be granted only upon a showing
that a fact existed which was not presented to the trial court
62. Id. at 680-81, 511 P.2d at 1154, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
63. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1018 (West Supp. 1975), supra note 39.
64. See People v. Caruso, 174 Cal. App. 2d 624, 642, 345 P.2d 282, 293 (1959),
where, on similar facts, the court of appeal decided that a defendant may not withdraw
his plea if he is disappointed with the sentence, or decides later that his chances of
acquittal by a jury are improved, or becomes apprehensive at the prospect of jail.
65. 9 Cal. 3d at 685, 511 P.2d at 1157, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
66. Id. at 686, 511 P.2d at 1157, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
67. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1265 (West 1970) provides that the petition must be filed
in the court which rendered judgment unless an appeal was taken from the judgment,
in which case the petition must be filed in the appellate court which affirmed the
judgment. See Kallay, Faith Without Illusion: The Petition For a Writ of Error Coram
Nobis, 47 L.A. BAR BULL. 21 (1971).
68. People v. Wheeler, 5 Cal. App. 3d 534, 536 n.2, 85 Cal. Rptr. 242, 244 n.2
(1970).
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and which, if presented, would have prevented rendition of
judgment; that the fact does not go to the merits of issues tried;
and that the fact was unknown to the defendant and could not9
have been discovered by him prior to the motion for the writ.
The requirements for granting the writ are such that fact
situations giving rise to a petition for the writ do not include
instances in which the defendant suffers from cold feet. In
People v. Lockridge the defendants moved the trial court to
stay execution of sentence on the ground that they had entered
their pleas of guilty on advice of counsel, who could have estab7
lished their innocence at trial. Implicit in the basis for the
motion was the defendants' belief that their chances of acquittal had substantially improved after the pleas were entered.
The court found that since defendants were aware of all relevant facts prior to entering their pleas, the legal requirements
7
for a writ of error coram nobis were not met. "
Defendants who attempt to withdraw their pleas solely
because they suffer from cold feet as they face jail terms will
not be afforded relief by way of coram nobis. Their claims are
based not upon facts that have come to light after entry of their
pleas, but on apprehension about or disappointment in their
sentences.
A defendant's alternative to petitioning for a writ of error
coram nobis is a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction.7 3 The procedure for perfecting an appeal from a judgment
based on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is contained in
Penal Code section 1237.5,11 which requires that an appellant
set forth grounds that go to the legality of the proceedings. It
must be noted that an order before judgment denying a motion
69. People v. Shipman, 62 Cal. 2d 226, 230, 397 P.2d 993, 995, 42 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3
(1965); People v. Lockridge, 233 Cal. App. 2d 743, 745, 43 Cal. Rptr. 925, 927 (1965);
see People v. Lampkin, 259 Cal. App. 2d 673, 675, 66 Cal. Rptr. 538, 540 (1968).
70. 233 Cal. App. 2d 743, 43 Cal. Rptr. 925 (1965).
71. Id. at 744, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 926. The court accepted the appellants' motion
as a writ of error coram nobis. Id. at 745, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
72. Id. at 746, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
73. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1237 (West 1970).
74. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1237.5 (West 1970) provides:
No appeal shall be taken by defendant from a judgment of conviction
upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, except where:
(a) The defendant has filed with the trial court a written statement,
executed under oath or penalty of perjury showing reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings; and
(b) The trial court has executed and filed a certificate of probable
cause for such appeal with the county clerk.
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to withdraw a plea of guilty is not appealable. Nevertheless, it
may be reviewed on appeal from the judgment."5
It is clear from the foregoing authority that the courts are
hesitant to grant the available remedy of withdrawal of the
guilty plea, absent a showing that there existed some factor
which served to override the defendant's exercise of free will.
A retreat from this position would encourage specious pleas
and sentence-shopping by defendants. There is no indication
that future California courts will more readily allow a defendant to rescind his bargain, unless he can make a clear showing
that the agreement was not entered into freely and voluntarily.
Bargain Breached by Prosecutor
Many plea bargains include a promise on the part of the
prosecutor to recommend a light sentence, to move to dismiss
certain charges, or to remain silent at the time of sentencing.
California courts have been more generous in granting relief to
defendants whose bargains have been breached by prosecutors.
They have followed the rule that "one who has pleaded guilty
in reliance on the unkept promises of reliable public officials
should be allowed to withdraw that plea, even after judgment
has been pronounced." 76 This illustrates the emphasis California courts have placed on the remedy of withdrawal of the
guilty plea, apparently to the exclusion of the alternate remedy
of specific performance.77
Recent developments in the law have strengthened the
position of the remedy of withdrawal. In the case of People v.
75. People v. Ribero, 4 Cal. 3d 55, 62, 480 P.2d 308, 313, 92 Cal. Rptr. 692, 697
(1971). In that case, the defendant appealed from an order denying his motion to
withdraw his plea of guilty. The court noted:
The impact of section 1237.5 relates to the procedure in perfecting an
appeal from a judgment based on a plea of guilty, and not to the grounds
upon which such an appeal may be taken.
Id. at 63, 480 P.2d at 313, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
76. People v. Wadkins, 63 Cal. 2d 110, 113, 403 P.2d 429, 432, 45 Cal. Rptr. 173,
176 (1965).
77. The United States Supreme Court recently had difficulty determining what
form of relief should be granted to a defendant whose bargain was broken by the
prosecutor in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). Chief Justice Burger's
plurality opinion remanded the case for state court consideration. Justice Douglas
reasoned that due process requires a determination of whether withdrawal or specific
performance is more appropriate in light of the circumstances of the case, with particular importance given to the defendant's preference. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart, argued that the defendant should be allowed to rescind
his plea as requested. Id. at 263-69.
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Barajas,5 the defendant entered a plea of guilty to possession
of narcotics, pursuant to a bargain in which the prosecutor
agreed to move to dismiss another charge and remain silent at
the time of sentencing. At the probation hearing the prosecutor
violated his agreement to remain silent, and induced the court
to abandon its previously announced intention to grant probation. 9 The appeals court had no trouble finding that a breach
of the terms of the bargain had been committed by the prosecutor."' Nevertheless, relief in this case was denied on the ground
that the defendant failed to move for a withdrawal of his plea
of guilty in the trial court, thereby failing to preserve the issue
on appeal: "Where the prosecution repudiates its part of the
plea bargain, the defendant's remedy is to move to withdraw
his plea of guilty in the trial court."'" This result is particularly
harsh, because the defendant was denied any remedy at all.
The Barajas decision appears at first glance to be inconsistent with the language of Penal Code section 1192.5.82 The
statute provides that if the court approves the plea, the punishment imposed must conform to the terms of the agreement.
The court may withdraw its approval at the probation hearing
or at time of sentencing, in which case the defendant "shall be
permitted to withdraw his plea if he desires to do so."" However, a careful reading of the section reveals that it applies only
78. 26 Cal. App. 3d 932, 103 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1972).
79. For an account of the exchange between the court and prosecutor at the
probation hearing, see id. at 935-36, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08.
80. Id. at 936-37, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 408; accord, Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257 (1971), in which the prosecutor agreed to make no recommendation as to sentence.
At the sentence hearing, a new district attorney recommended the maximum sentence,
and the judge followed that recommendation. The Supreme Court had no trouble
finding this to be a breach of the bargain by the prosecutor.
81. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 937, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 408 (citations omitted); see People
v. Delles, 69 Cal. 2d 906, 910, 447 P.2d 629, 632, 73 Cal. Rptr. 389, 392 (1968).
82. The text of the statute is contained in note 11 supra. The section, as originally enacted in 1970, included within its provisions pleas of guilty or nolo contendere
to an information or indictment. This, of course, excluded a plea of guilty to a complaint charging a felony or misdemeanor in the municipal court. A 1974 amendment
to the section replaced "information or indictment" with "accusatory pleading charging a felony." CAL. PEN. CODE § 1192.5 (West Supp. 1975). The result is an expansion
of the availability of the terms of the section: "A recent (1974) amendment to section
1192.5 has confirmed the availability of felony plea bargaining in the municipal court."
Malone v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 313, 318 n.4, 120 Cal. Rptr. 851, 854 n.4
(1975). A reasonable construction of the foregoing is that the section is applicable only
to felony prosecutions which are disposed of by plea bargaining. All misdemeanor
prosecutions would therefore be subject to the law applicable to motions under sections
1018, 1237.5 and petitions for writs of error coram nobis.
83. The text of the statute is contained in note 11 supra.
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to plea bargains which formally specify the terms of punishment. Barajas pleaded guilty pursuant to a bargain which did
not specify the terms of punishment,"4 but merely included a
promise on the part of the prosecutor to remain silent at the
sentencing hearing.8 5 Barajas failed to move to withdraw his
plea of guilty in the trial court under Penal Code section 1018,
resulting in a denial of any relief on appeal."
Had the plea bargain in Barajas come within the provisions of section 1192.5, a different result would have been
reached. The statute provides that a plea not accepted by the
prosecutor and approved by the court is "deemed withdrawn."
And if the court approves the plea, but prior to sentencing
withdraws its approval, the defendant "shall be permitted to
withdraw his plea if he desires to do so." 87 Initially, however,
there was a question as to whether the defendant or the court
had the burden of initiating withdrawal of the guilty plea.
The California Supreme Court faced this issue squarely in
8 In
People v. Johnson.1
that case the defendant pleaded guilty
to forgery pursuant to a court-approved bargain in which he
was to receive a misdemeanor sentence, suspension of sentence
and a grant of probation. Prior to the scheduled sentencing
hearing, the court discovered that in negotiating the plea bargain Johnson had concealed his true name and past criminal
record. This discovery induced the judge to withdraw his approval of the bargain and to sentence the defendant to prison
for the term prescribed by law.89 Johnson was not at any time
informed of his right under Penal Code section 1192.510 to withdraw his plea in the event the court withdrew its approval of
the bargain. The failure of the court to inform the defendant
of his rights under Penal Code section 1192.51' was deemed
reversible error. In reversing, the California Supreme Court
84. See People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970), in
which the defendant, with the consent of the prosecutor, pleaded guilty to a lesser
offense than that charged. The trial court accepted the plea and entered judgment.
On appeal the court stated that "section 1192.5 [does not] encompass the form of plea
bargain used in the present case, that is, the plea to a lesser offense without specification of punishment.
...
Id. at 608, 477 P.2d at 416, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
85. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 935, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
86. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
87. The text of the statute is contained in note 11 supra.
88. 10 Cal. 3d 868, 519 P.2d 604, 112 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1974).
89. Id. at 870-71, 519 P.2d at 605, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
90. See note 11 supra.
91. The requirements of section 1192.5 are set out in the text accompanying note
128 infra.

19751

RENEGED PLEA BARGAINS

held that the court may not impose a sentence contrary to the
terms of the proposed bargain without giving the defendant an
opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty."
Johnson, like Barajas, had failed to affirmatively request
a change of plea after the court withdrew its prior approval of
the plea bargain. The court determined that the "deemed
withdrawn" language of section 1192.5 indicates that the court
must give the defendant an opportunity to change his plea
when it initially rejects his plea and when it withdraws its prior
approval of the bargain. 4
This conclusion places the burden on the court to see that
5
the procedures outlined in section 1192.5 are complied with.
Prior to the making of the plea, the court must advise each
defendant of his right to withdraw his plea in the event the
court later withdraws its approval of the bargain. Furthermore,
the defendant must be afforded the opportunity to enter a new
plea after the court does withdraw its approval.
The Johnson decision established the right of a defendant
whose bargain has been broken either by the prosecutor or the
court (resulting in the court's rejection of the offer) to withdraw
his plea of guilty and enter a new plea. The effect of this may
be to foreclose the availability of specific performance as a
remedy for these types of breach. In Johnson the defendant
argued that he should have the option of enforcing the original
bargain according to its terms, as an alternative to the right to
92. 10 Cal. 3d at 872, 519 P.2d at 606, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
93. Id. at 871, 519 P.2d at 606, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
94. The court succinctly stated its conclusion and reasoning:
Although this provision by its terms appears to apply to the initial rejection of a defendant's offer for a plea bargain, rather than to the court's
withdrawal of its prior approval of such a bargain, nevertheless this language confirms our view that the Legislature intended that in either
situation defendant be given the opportunity to change his plea.
Id. at 872, 519 P.2d at 606-07, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 558-59.
95. Had the Barajasbargain been included within the terms of section 1192.5,
this conclusion would have overruled Barajas.
There is language in People v. Delles, 69 Cal.2d 906, 910-11 [73 Cal.Rptr. 389, 447
P.2d 629], suggesting that the burden might be upon defendant to move the trial court
to withdraw the guilty plea, or to move to vacate the judgment. Delles, however, was
decided prior to the enactment of section 1192.5 which, as we have seen, requires the
trial court to inform defendant of his right to withdraw the plea, and which "deems"
the plea withdrawn in the event the bargain is not approved by the court. See also
People v. Barajas,26 Cal.App.3d 932, 937 [103 Cal.Rptr. 405]. Id. at 872, n.3, 519 P.2d
at 607 n.3, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 559 n.3.
96. Note that Johnson involved a court breach. Nevertheless, its principles are
equally applicable to cases of breach by the prosecutor.
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withdraw his plea. The court, finding nothing in the language
of section 1192.5 which compels specific performance, rejected
defendant's argument. 7
We think it sufficient . . . to require the court to provide
defendant with an opportunity to withdraw his plea, despite defendant's failure to request such an opportunity.
Certainly nothing in the language of section 1192.5 compels any further relief."
The court's concern with the fact that Johnson had made serious misrepresentations while negotiating the plea bargain reinforced its "reluctance to create a right to specific performance
of a plea bargain . . . ."" Other courts may refuse to grant the
remedy of specific performance because they are reluctant to
allow the defendants to "dictate" the disposition of their
cases.'00 Nevertheless, specific performance is more closely tailored to the circumstances of each unkept bargain,'0 ' and therefore provides more effective relief to a defendant. Withdrawal
may be an unsatisfactory form of relief to the defendant because he is not returned to the pre-bargain status quo. He must
face the time and expense of pretrial procedures, and he may
have disclosed information damaging to his defense.' 2 Thus,
the remedy granted in Johnson may be more illusory than substantive to the bargaining defendant.
The future availability of specific performance as a remedy
97. 10 Cal. 3d at 873, 519 P.2d at 607, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
98. Id.
99. Id. The court placed particular emphasis on Johnson's misconduct in negotiating the bargain. Nevertheless, the "deemed withdrawn" language of section 1192.5
as applied in Johnson appears to be the reason for the court's refusal to consider
specific performance.
100. See the comments of the trial judge in People v. Smith, 22 Cal. App. 3d 25,
29, 99 Cal. Rptr. 171, 173 (1971). Among the court's statements was the following:
"[L]ooks to me like the possibility that the people who have violated the law are
dictating the disposition of their case rather than the Judge." Here the court refused
to consider the defendant's conditional plea at all. See note 118 infra.
101. Note, The Legitimation of Plea Bargaining:Remedies ForBroken Promises,
11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 771, 793 (1973).
102. Id. In addition, upon withdrawing his plea of guilty defendant may have to
face reinstatement of the original, higher charges and conviction for a more serious
offense. See Comment, The Constitutionality of Reindicting Successful Plea-Bargain
Appellants on the Original, Higher Charges, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 258 (1974).
In the case of In re Sutherland, 6 Cal. 3d 666, 493 P.2d 857, 100 Cal. Rptr. 129
(1972), the court did restore the status quo:
Since by granting relief we are in effect permitting defendant to withdraw
his guilty plea, the ends of justice require that the status quo ante be
restored by reviving the four dismissed counts.
Id. at 672, 493 P.2d at 861, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
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when "the prosecutor violates the terms of the agreement is not
absolutely certain. Johnson has considerably expanded the
availability of plea withdrawal, but recognition of the right to
withdraw a plea of guilty appears to have foreclosed the availability of specific performance. However, the Johnson court did
03
not reject specific performance outright. It merely refused to
acknowledge a right to specific persormance.
It has been suggested by one commentator that section
1192.5 has restricted the trial judge to permitting withdrawal
of the defendant's plea in compliance with section 1192.5 only
when the prosecutor or court breaches the bargain prior to
sentencing; consequently, if the bargain is breached after the
probation and sentencing hearing and subsequent to the
court's giving final approval of the bargain, section 1192.5 may
not be applicable and the remedy of specific performance may
be available.'" 4 However, the Johnson court's negative attitude
toward any general availability of specific performance seems
to render this suggested distinction meaningless. A more probable conclusion after Johnson is that even if section 1192.5 does
not cover breaches which occur after the court gives final approval of the bargain, the court's disapproval of specific performance would render the remedy unavailable in the vast majority of such cases.
The alternative for a defendant whose bargain has been
breached by the prosecutor and who has not moved under section 1018 to withdraw his plea of guilty, or whose bargain does
103. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
This conclusion has resulted in an interesting post-Johnson decision. In People v.
Newton, 42 Cal. App. 3d 292, 116 Cal. Rptr. 690 (1974), the defendant pleaded guilty
to receiving stolen property, using a stolen credit card and possession of heroin, after
the prosecutor represented that he would recommend commitment to the rehabilitation facility. The plea was accepted by one judge; at the sentencing hearing before
another judge, a different deputy district attorney failed to make the promised recommendation. The defendant was sentenced to prison. On appeal the court reversed with
instructions to give the prosecutor the opportunity to make good his representation. If
the prosecutor refused to comply, the defendant could withdraw his guilty plea and
enter a new plea:
Because this case lends itself to specific performance under the alternative procedure delineated in Santobello v. New York and People v.
Johnson, the judgment . . . is reversed.
Id. at 298, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 694-95 (citations omitted).
While specific performance was set forth as an alternative to withdrawal, the court
allowed the prosecutor, not the defendant, to choose the most appropriate alternative.
The defendant was not given the right to choose the remedy of specific performance.
104. Fischer, supra note 34, at 137. There is no available California case law to
support this suggestion.
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not fall within the provisions of section 1192.5, is to file a petition for writ of error coram nobis.' °5 The court in People v.
Wadkins'0 held that coram nobis was proper where a defendant sought to change his plea of guilty after the prosecutor
failed to abide by the terms of his plea bargain. 0 There is no
indication that any relief other than allowing withdrawal of the
guilty plea is appropriate under the coram nobis procedure., 8
Bargain Breached by Court
Plea bargains which have been frustrated by acts or omissions of the judge make up the third category of litigated guilty
pleas. It has been recognized that judicial participation in plea
bargaining presents special problems.' For this reason, courts
have been more receptive to defendants' requests for relief
where frustration of their bargains has been precipitated by the
courts. "The idea behind court participation in plea bargaining
is to spread the entire bargain on the table and make it a part
of the record.""10 At the same time, judicial participation must
be kept to a minimum to avoid unintentional coercion of defendants."' Relief is often granted if the judge violates his duties
in the bargaining process.
People v. Delles"I serves as an appropriate example of how
105. The procedural requirements for filing a writ of error coram nobis are set
forth in notes 67-69 and accompanying text supra.
106. 63 Cal. 2d 110, 403 P.2d 429, 45 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1965).
107. Id. at 113, 403 P.2d at 432, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 176; see People v. Phillips, 263
Cal. App. 2d 423, 426, 69 Cal. Rptr. 675, 677 (1968):
It is settled that a petition for a writ of error coram nobis is an
appropriate means to raise the contention that defendant was induced to
plead guilty in reliance on an unkept promise by a state official.
108. See People v. Campos, 3 Cal. 2d 15, 43 P.2d 274 (1935); People v. Schwarz,
201 Cal. 309, 257 P. 71 (1927); People v. Miller, 114 Cal. 10, 45 P. 986 (1896).
109. People v. Williams, 269 Cal. App. 2d 879, 884, 75 Cal. Rptr. 348, 351 (1969);
see People v. Orin, 13 Cal. 3d 937, 533 P.2d 193, 120 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1975), in which the
court accepted defendant's offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense over the People's
objection. The appeals court stated the trial court cannot substitute itself for the
People in negotiations. To do so
would detract from the judge's ability to remain detached and neutral in
evaluating the voluntariness of the plea and the fairness of the bargain
to society as well as to the defendant ....
Id. at 943, 533 P.2d at 197, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
110. People v. Ramos, 26 Cal. App. 3d 108, 111, 102 Cal. Rptr. 502, 504 (1972)
(citations omitted).
111. People v. Williams, 269 Cal. App. 2d 879, 884, 75 Cal. Rptr. 348, 351 (1969).
112. 69 Cal. 2d 906, 447 P.2d 629, 73 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1968); see People v. Pinon,
35 Cal. App. 3d 120, 110 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1973), in which the court failed to advise the
defendant that his probation (which was one of the terms of a plea bargain) would be
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this type of breach commonly occurs. The defendant entered
into an agreement with the court in which he consented to
plead guilty to possession of marijuana in exchange for a fourmonth jail term and probation. The court granted probation
and stayed execution of sentence for two weeks. During that
time it learned that the defendant had been arrested on another narcotics charge prior to the date on which probation was
granted. The trial judge then announced his intention to revoke
probation, and the defendant moved to withdraw his plea of
guilty. The motion was denied and the defendant was sentenced to prison."' On appeal the court directed the trial judge
to either reinstate probation or permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. The court of appeal reasoned:
If a defendant pleads guilty as part of a bargain with an
apparently authoritative and reliable public official-usually the prosecutor or, as here, the trial judge
himself-whereby he is assured of receiving in return for
his plea probation, a lenient sentence, or some other form
of special consideration, the trial judge may not impose
judgement contrary to the terms of such bargain without
affording the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his
"I
guilty plea ....
The Delles decision was followed by People v. Ramos,' in
which the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possessing
dangerous drugs in exchange for the judge's promise to dismiss
all remaining counts, strike five prior convictions, grant probation and impose no additional time in custody. The trial court
then sentenced the defendant to prison for violation of probation on three of the five priors. Defendant sought to withdraw
his plea, arguing that he had understood the bargain to include
all five priors. The trial court denied the motion."'
The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge,
and gave him the option to permit withdrawal of the guilty plea
or to grant probation in compliance with the terms of the agreement." 7
revoked upon conviction of another charge. The court of appeal stated that if the court

is unable to comply with the terms of the bargain, the defendant must be given the
opportunity to change his plea. Nevertheless, relief was denied here because the defendant did not move to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court. Id. at 125-26, 110 Cal.
Rptr. at 410.
113. 69 Cal. 2d at 908, 447 P.2d at 630-31, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 390-91.
114. Id. at 910, 447 P.2d at 632, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
115. 26 Cal. App. 3d 108, 102 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1972).
116. Id. at 110, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 503-04.
117. Id. at 112, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
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Similar grounds for breach include the court's arbitrary
rejection of the defendant's proffered bargain without taking
the offer into consideration," 8 and incorrect representations
made by the court which become part of the bargain."'
Delles and Ramos explicitly provide for either plea withdrawal or specific performance, at the discretion of the trial
court. However, Delles was decided prior to the enactment of
section 1192.5, and Ramos was decided prior to Johnson. In
both Delles and Ramos, the trial courts withdrew prior approval of the bargains and sentenced defendants to prison without affording them opportunities to withdraw their pleas. The
language of section 1192.5 is applicable to the Delles and
Ramos situations; Johnson would limit the available remedy
(when the court reneges on the bargain prior to sentencing) to
withdrawal of the guilty plea.'20 Therefore the Johnson interpretation of the "deemed withdrawn" language may have
effectively eliminated the option of the trial court to allow
withdrawal or to grant specific performance. 2 '
Another line of recent decisions involves a failure by the
court to disclose the terms of the bargain in their entirety. In
People v. Williams,'22 the court assured the defendant that if
he entered a plea of guilty, it would be within the court's discretion to grant probation. Prior to sentencing the court learned
that Penal Code section 1203 prevented granting probation,
absent unusual circumstances. Since there were none, the defendant was sentenced to prison. The appeals court reversed
the judgment, and granted the defendant's motion to withdraw
his plea of guilty. The court ruled that "if an uncoerced bargain
is made it must be carried out by the court or withdrawal of
the guilty plea must be allowed."' 2 3
118. People v. Smith, 22 Cal. App. 2d 25, 99 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1971). In this case
the trial judge expressed hostility to a plea bargain which had been accepted by the
prosecutor and previously approved by the court. The judge refused to accept the
defendant's conditional plea, and the appeals court found this arbitrary refusal to be
an abuse of discretion. Id. at 30, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
119. People v. Flores, 6 Cal. 3d 305, 491 P.2d 406, 98 Cal. Rptr. 822 (1971); People
v. Williams, 269 Cal. App. 2d 879, 75 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1969); c.f. People v. Ramos, 26
Cal. App. 3d 108, 102 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1972).
120. See text accompanying notes 93-97 supra.
121. See text accompanying note 94 supra. Note that when an act which is
inconsistent with the terms of the bargain after judgment is committed, the court may,
in its discretion, grant relief. See People v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 793, 523 P.2d
636, 114 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1974); People v. Allen, 46 Cal. App. 3d 583, 120 Cal. Rptr.
127 (1975).
122. 269 Cal. App. 2d 879, 75 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1969).
123. Id. at 884, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
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A similar case is People v. Flores,'4 in which the bargaining defendant was not advised that the charge to which he
agreed to plead guilty added a mandatory consecutive term of
five more years to his minimum sentence.' 5 The supreme court
held that the defendant was not subject to the additional term
because it was not disclosed in the original bargain. Defendant's remedy was to "move to have his plea set aside, or the
judgment may be modified to conform with the terms of his
bargain."'2 6 The court ruled that under these circumstances
defendant must be given the benefit of his bargain.'
These cases again point out the availability of withdrawal
and specific performance as remedies to a defendant whose
bargain has been frustrated. This allows flexibility in order to
provide the most meaningful remedy to the defendant. However, these cases, too, were decided prior to Johnson, which
construed the "deemed withdrawn" language of section 1192.5
as requiring the court only to give the defendant an opportunity
to withdraw his plea. In Williams and Flores the courts imposed sentences inconsistent with the stated terms of the agreement, thereby implicitly withdrawing their prior approval of
the original bargains. Therefore Johnson would seem to bar the
remedy of specific performance to defendants in future misrepresentation cases of this type. The remedy of plea withdrawal
of right remains available.
Finally there is another means by which a court may violate its duty in the plea bargaining process. Section 1192.5
requires the following procedure:
If the court approves of the plea, it shall inform the
defendant prior to the making of the plea that (1) its approval is not binding, (2) it may, at the time set for the
hearing on the application for probation or pronouncement
of judgment, withdraw its approval in the light of further
124. 6 Cal. 3d 305, 491 P.2d 406, 98 Cal. Rptr. 822 (1971).
125. CAL. PEN. CODE § 12022.5 (West 1970) provides in part:
Any person who uses a firearm in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, murder, rape, burglary, or kidnapping, upon conviction of such crime, shall, in addition to
the punishment prescribed for the crime of which he has been convicted,
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a period of not less
than five years. Such additional period of punishment ...

concurrently with such sentence.
Flores had pleaded guilty to armed robbery.
126. 6 Cal. 3d at 309, 491 P.2d at 408, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
127. Id.

shall not run
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consideration of the matter, and (3) in such case, the defendant shall be permitted to withdraw his plea if he desires to do so.' 28
In Johnson the trial judge failed to comply with these statutory
requirements. At no time between the filing of the information
and the date of sentencing was Johnson advised of his right to
withdraw his plea in the event the court withdrew its approval
of the bargain. The California Supreme Court responded to this
issue by requiring the trial court to comply with the stated
procedures of section 1192.5.29 The court must provide the defendant with an opportunity to change his plea upon its revocation of prior approval of the bargain. The judgment, therefore,
was reversed, with instructions to allow Johnson to withdraw
his plea of guilty and enter a new plea.' 30
Noncompliance with the statutory requirements is not a
literal "breach" of the terms of the bargain by the court. However, the Johnson court determined that strict compliance with
the provisions of section 1192.5 is mandatory. Violation is reversible error, for which the appropriate remedy is withdrawal
of the plea.' 3 ' As in the cases of literal breach of the terms of
the bargain by the prosecutor or the court, Johnson seems to
have foreclosed specific performance.
The alternative remedy of coram nobis clearly has been
available in cases of breach of the terms of the bargain by the
court.'3 2 However, in view of the strict compliance with the
terms of section 1192.5 required by Johnson, it would seem that
coram nobis is not needed to remedy such a breach. An appeal
under section 1237.5 would be the proper method to seek review
3
of violations of section 1192.5.'1
CONCLUSION

Plea bargaining is constitutionally acceptable.' It is necessary, however, to strike a balance between use of the plea
bargain to facilitate disposition of criminal cases, and the enormous gravity of a defendant's waiver of constitutional rights.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
(1969).
133.
134.

§ 1192.5 (West Supp. 1975).
10 Cal. 3d at 872, 519 P.2d at 605, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
Id. at 871, 519 P.2d at 606, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
Id.
People v. Williams, 269 Cal. App. 2d 879, 885-86, 75 Cal. Rptr. 348, 352
CAL. PEN. CODE

See notes 73-75 supra.
See notes 9 & 10 supra.
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Therefore, full disclosure to a defendant of his rights is necessary in order to assure that his plea is freely and voluntarily
made.
Defendants who suffer from "cold feet" after their bargains have been approved by the prosecution and the court are
not likely to be provided with any remedy at all. The exception
is when a defendant makes a clear showing that the plea was
not entered freely and voluntarily, or that there was unfairness
in the bargaining process.'35 In such case he may be allowed to
withdraw his plea and enter a new one.
Defendants whose bargains have been breached by the
prosecutor or court prior to sentencing may withdraw their plea
of guilty and enter new pleas. The availability of specific performance of the terms of their agreements is less certain, however. Decisions prior to Johnson recognized the validity and
availability of both remedies.'36 This is consonant with recent
emphasis on flexibility and fairness to the defendant in the
bargaining process. Nevertheless, the Johnson interpretation of
the language of section 1192.5 requires only that the defendant
be afforded an opportunity to withdraw his plea after a breach
of the terms of the bargain occurs. This would seem to preclude
the availability of specific performance as a remedy in all cases
except possibly those in which the breach occurs after sentencing and final approval by the court.
This position appears to be inconsistent with the California courts' earlier recognition of the availability of specific performance as a remedy. The Johnson court, however, clearly
indicated dissatisfaction with allowing specific performance of
the agreement.'37
It has been argued that the ultimate remedy for breach of
a plea bargain should be chosen by the injured party, in the
interest of fair play. 3 ' Until that time arrives, the right to withdrawal of a guilty plea precludes such a choice in the vast
majority of plea bargained cases.
Frederick G. Wood
135. See note 52 supra.
136. See People v. Flores, 6 Cal. 3d 305, 491 P.2d 406, 98 Cal. Rptr. 822 (1971);
People v. Delles, 69 Cal. 2d 906, 447 P.2d 629, 73 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1968); People v.
Barajas, 26 Cal. App. 3d 108, 102 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1972); People v. Williams, 269 Cal.
App. 2d 879, 75 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1969).
137. See note 100 supra.
138. Fischer, supra note 34, at 143.

